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COMMENTS
SELECTING A REMEDY FOR PRIVATE RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION: STATUTES IN SEARCH OF
SCOPE
I. Introduction
Racial discrimination in the United States has been effectively
attacked in both the legislatures and the courts for over a hundred
years. Enslavement of blacks in the American South prompted
adoption of the thirteenth amendment' and the Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts 2 enacted pursuant to the amendment's enabling
- clause.3 These laws sought primarily to elevate the status of the
black freedman by granting him rights equal to those enjoyed by
white citizens. The most far-reaching of these statutes is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,1 which insures to
all persons. the same right to make and enforce contracts.5
Until quite recently, section 1981 had been an obscure and little-
used declaration of rights. This resulted in part from the refusal of
courts to recognize the section as a remedy for purely private dis-
1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
2. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted, Enforcement Act of 1870,
ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970)).
3. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII.
4. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted, Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970)). Due to a codifier's error,
some doubt arose as to whether the entire 1866 act had been re-enacted by the Enforcement
Act of 1870, with the result that some jurisdictions considered 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to be derived
from the 1870 Act. See, e.g., Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd,
.458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that §. 1981 is
directly descended from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 786-89
(1966); see Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justification for a
Judicial Trend, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1024 (1972).
5. "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no other." 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970).
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criminatory acts. They instead insisted that a showing of "state
action" was an essential element of any cause of action thereunder.
In the landmark decision of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.7 the
Supreme Court, however, ruled for the first time that section 1981
was intended to prohibit all acts of racial discrimination,' including
those by private parties not acting under color of law. To support
this finding, Justice Stewart examined the historical circumstances
surrounding the passage of the 1866 Act and concluded that the law
had been intended to eradicate both government-supported and
purely racial private discrimination as "badges and incidences of
slavery."'
Since Jones, section 1981 has enjoyed a judicial resurrection of
sorts, particularly in cases involving allegations of job-related dis-
crimination by private employers. Prevailing plaintiffs in job dis-
crimination actions have been awarded both damages and injunc-
tive relief, 0 the latter remedy frequently taking the form of
judicially-imposed "affirmative action" decrees."
However, the explosive growth of litigation brought pursuant to
section 1981 has not gone totally uncontrolled. The statute speaks
only of discrimination grounded in racial bias. Attempts to expand
the coverage of the statute beyond its unequivocal terms-for exam-
ple, to include sex-based discrimination-have generally met with
failure." Even a claim by a plaintiff that he has been deprived of
6. See, e.g., Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949).
7. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
8. "If Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that
prevent Negroes from buying and renting property because of their race or color, then no fed-
eral statute calculated to achieve that objective can be thought to exceed the constitutional
power of Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of
private individuals." Id. at 438-39.
9. Id. at 440. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, noted:
Some badges of slavery remain today. While the institution has been outlawed, it
has remained in the minds and hearts of many white men. Cases which have come to
this Court depict a spectacle of slavery unwilling to die. . . .The men who sat in
Congress in 1866 were trying to remove some of the badges . . . of slavery when they
enacted § 1982.
Id. at 445-49.
10. Sudh awards are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970); see Brewer v. Hoxie School
Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
11. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
12. See, e.g., Abshire v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 352 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Marshall
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civil rights solely on account of race does not guarantee that the
courts will take cognizance of his complaint under section 1981.' 3
Two reasons are usually given to explain the courts' reluctance to
apply the statute. First, some courts, looking to the historical facts
which prompted enactment of the Reconstruction Acts, insist that
section 1981 was designed to protect the Negro only, and that whites
may not use it to press a claim under any circumstances.' 4 Second,
certain forums believe that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, '5
which provides certain remedies for private discrimination pre-
empts the subject matter, and that any section 1981 action is impro-
per, the grievant's race notwithstanding.' 8 Title VII proscribes em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of race,'7 national origin, color,
sex, or religion. It establishes the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC),' s which is charged with investigating all
claims of discrimination, racial, or otherwise. Should the EEOC
determine that an unlawful practice has occured, it must attempt
to conciliate the claim.'9 The aggrieved party may not resort to
litigation unless EEOC conciliation efforts are unsuccessful or fail
to reach a settlement within 180 days' time."° To allow actions for
private discrimination under section 1981, it is felt, would effec-
tively permit aggrieved parties to bypass the EEOC conciliation
route and flood the courts With unnecessary lawsuits."
v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 60, 343 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1972); Fitzgerald v. United
Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972); Schetter v. Heim, 300 F.
Supp. 1070 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
13. See text accompanying notes 68-88 infra.
14. McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 264
(1975); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Balc v. United
Steelworkers of America, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6037 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d
Cir. 1974).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. III,
1973).
16. Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 91 (D.D.C. 1973).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1973).
18. Id. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. 111, 1973); see text accompanying notes 70-77 infra.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 111, 1973) provides:
If the Commission determines after ... investigation that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. III, 1973); see Fekete v. United States Steel Corp.,
424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
21. See, e.g., Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970).
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Where courts have acknowledged the existence of a cause of ac-
tion under section 1981, liberal relief has been granted. Not content
merely to enjoin present and future discrimination, the federal dis-
trict courts have taken it upon themselves to undo the effects of past
discrimination." To attain this goal, courts have often directed
employers to erase these effects by granting certain groups not
merely equal, but preferential treatment in future hiring and ad-
vancement.23 Such "affirmative action" decrees have been widely
criticized on the ground that they protect one group's civil rights at
the expense of all others'. 4
These conflicting views regarding section 1981's proper sweep
have produced conflicting decisions in the federal courts.25 When
the plaintiff seeking relief from racial bias under section 1981 is
white, the courts may dispose of the action in several ways, none of
them totally satisfactory. For example, they can deny the claim and
refer the plaintiff to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; but if
speedy injunctive relief is needed to avoid irreparable harm, or if
plaintiff is not within the classes of persons protected by Title VII,
procuring adequate relief may be impossible. 6 Conversely, the court
may recognize the claim, but so opting permits the plaintiff to effec-
tively side-step the EEOC.27 Furthermore, by granting whites a
cause of action, the courts may have to overturn prior "affirmative
action" decrees in order to insure the equality of rights guaranteed
by section 1981.1
This Comment shall attempt to evaluate section 1981's proper
place in the enforcement of civil rights by examining whether sec-
tion 1981 was intended to benefit whites as well as blacks, the pro-
priety of asserting a section 1981 claim without first seeking recourse
22. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1964).
23. See Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (1974); Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
24. See text accompanying notes 135-43 infra.
25. Compare Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 91 (D.D.C. 1973); Smith v.
North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. .1970) (favoring elimination of §
1981 as a cause of action) with Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D.
Conn. 1975) (regarding § 1981 as a separate and distinct remedy from Title VII).
26. See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 82-88 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 134-52 infra.
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under Title VII, and the effect of section 1981 actions by white
plaintiffs upon the power of the district courts to impose "affirma-
tive action" decrees.
II. Availability of § 1981 to White Plaintiffs
While blacks have been most heavily scarred by "badges of slav-
ery," whites are also susceptible to discrimination grounded in race.
In Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 9 a white college student
brought an action pursuant to section 1981, alleging that defendant
refused to consider him for employment in the Sears Summer In-
ternship Program for Minority Students solely because he was white
and not a member of a minority group. Defendant moved to dismiss
on the ground that the statute, which provides that "all persons...
shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts...
as is enjoyed by white citizens" 0 granted a cause of action for non-
whites only." While conceding that some support existed for defen-
dant's broad claim,3" the court denied the motion to disiniss," hold-
ing that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" ought not to
be read as restricting the scope of the statute, but merely as empha-
sizing the racial nature of the rights being protected.34
A. § 1981's Legislative History
The decision in Hollander seems well-supported by the legislative
history of section 1981. As originally passed by the Senate, section
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not contain the controversial
phrase; it was added by amendment in the House of Representa-
tives.35 During Senate debate on the original bill, opponents of the
measure decried it as providing federal protection for black citizens
which had never been accorded whites.3" Senator Lyman Trumbull
of Illinois, the proposal's floor manager, contended in reply: (1) that
29. 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (emphasis added).
31. 392 F. Supp. at 92.
32. Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 285 F.2d 426 (4th Cir.
1960); Balc v. United Steelworkers of America, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6037 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala.
1973).
33. 392 F. Supp. at 95.
34. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
35. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866).
36. Id. at.599.
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the bill applied to white men as well as black men, with equal force;
(2) that no provision in the proposed statute could fairly be read as
extending relief to blacks only; and (3) that "the very object of the
bill is to break down all discrimination between black men and
white men." 7 After the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" was
added in the House, and the bill was resubmitted to the Senate for
consideration of the House amendments, Senator Trumbull con-
vinced his colleagues that the newwords were superfluous and in
no way altered the meaning of the bill. 8 The Senate thereupon
approved the amendment without further debate. 9 The phrase had
been added by Iowa Congressman James F. Wilson, the bill's floor
manager in the House, who provided virtually no explanation for his
amendment; 0 but there is no mention of the phrase in the House
debates which would conflict with the Senate's understanding." In
light of these facts, Hollander concluded that the phrase did not
place a limitation upon the scope of protection afforded by section
1981 42
Although the rights enjoyed by whites are used as the measuring stick under
§ 1981, whites themselves may be denied the rights which are normally
available to members of their race. When that occurs within the scope of
activities protected by § 1981, and it is a result of racial discrimination, §
1981 provides them with a cause of action.
37. Id. at 599-600. Senator Trumbull commented that the bill would add nothing to the
federal authority if the states would "fully perform their constitutional obligations." Id. at
600. However, Trumbull and his fellow proponents of the measure considered the legislation
necessary because Negroes might be "oppressed and in fact deprived of freedom" not only
by hostile laws but also by prevailing public sentiment. Id. at 77. Only if by local legislation
the states provided for "the real freedom of their former slaves" would the bill become
superfluous. Id. See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
38. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1413 (1866).
39. Id. at 1118.
40. Id. at 474.
41. See Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90, 93 (D. Conn. 1975).
42. Id. at 94. The court also expressed its belief that its interpretation of the statute
comported with the settled rule of statutory construction set forth in Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1943). Judge Learned Hand stated in the Tremaine
case:
There is no su'rer guide in the interpretation of a statute than its purpose when that is
sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark of over solicitude for the letter than to wince





B. § 1981 in the Courts
But Hollander was by no means the first decision to acknowledge
that whites have standing to sue under section 1981. As early as
1905, in Kentucky v. Powers,43 part of the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts44 had been interpreted to apply to discrimination
against whites as well as those of other races.45 In Walker v.
Pointer," white plaintiffs alleged that they had been evicted from
their apartment because they had entertained Negro guests there.
They brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which, together
with section 1981, had in original form been part of section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. 41 In holding that the action had been pro-
perly brought, the court stated that to limit the availability of relief
from discrimination to blacks only would be to give the statute a
"racist construction incompatible with the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment."4 Congress, by enacting section 1981, sought
to abolish racial discrimination in contracting. In WRMA Broad-
casting Co. v. Hawthorne," it was argued that courts should not
unnecessarily limit the operation of the statute. While Congress in
1866 was primarily concerned with eliminating white discrimination
against freedmen, the obvious intent of the statute ought not to
be ignored should discrimination by blacks arise in some rare
43. 201 U.S. 1 (1906) (dictum).
44. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted, Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
45. 201 U.S. at 32.
46. 304 F. Supp. 56, 57 (N.D. Tex. 1969). The holding and logic of Walker, at least insofar
as it concerns the capacity of whites to sue under § 1982, should be applied to § 1981, the
other section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 enacted at the same time. As was stated in
Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240, 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1969), modified, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th
Cir. 1971), "[tlhe history and purposes of these sections are so similar that any distinction
would be artificial."
47. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted, Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970)). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
48. 304 F. Supp. at 58.
[Rjudimentary application of the Thirteenth Amendment freedom from involuntary
servitude was not extended on a basis of racial qualification but rather was responsive
to whether any individual suffered from the wrong the Amendment was created to
cure. Making relief available to the white victim of discrimination against black people
adheres to this earlier, established Thirteenth Amendment principle.
Id.
49. 365 F. Supp. 577, 581 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
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instances. ° As indicated in Central Presbyterian Church v. Black
Liberation Front," nothing in section 1981 limits its application to
cases where the civil rights of non-whites are being violated. "In-
deed, it would be unfair to deprive white Americans of the benefit
of these sections . ".. 52
The notion that section 1981 protects all victims of racial discrim-
ination is implicitly buttressed by several cases which have held
that whites who allege nonracially motivated discrimination under
the statute have no standing to sue. 3 Courts have repeatedly held
that only suits based on racial discrimination may be maintained
under section 1981, since the statute's plain purpose is "to provide
for equality of rights as between persons of different races."54
By contrast, decisions denying whites redress under section 1981
for alleged racial discrimination have often been vague and conciu-
sory in their reasoning. For example, in Perkins v. Banster,5 a white
plaintiff asserted that he had been injured by acts of racial bias, and
sought relief under section 1981. The court declined to exercise juris-
diction over the claim, stating:5"
Section 1981 is the equal rights section giving to non-white persons the same
rights which are enjoyed by white persons. Since the plaintiff, obviously and
admittedly, is a white person, Section 1981 serves as no basis for jurisdiction
in this case.
No further rationale or authority in support of the decision was
offered. Apparently, the Perkins court believed that section 1981's
grant of freedom to contract extended to non-whites only.57 The
statute's legislative history, however, as traced in Hollander, seems
to indicate that Congress intended a contrary interpretation." Ripp
50. Id.
.51. 303 F. Supp. 894, 899 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
52. Id. at 899.
53. Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 959
(1957); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Willis v. Chicago
Extruded Metals Co., 358 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. I1. 1973); Abshire v. Chicago & E. Ill, R.R.,
352 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Marshall v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 60, 343 F.
Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1972).
54. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226, 230
(9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 959 (1957).
55. 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiarn, 285 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1960).
56. Id. at 99.
57. See id.
58. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
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v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.5" involved a white plaintiff's claim that he was
illegally discharged by defendant employer because of his associa-
tion with and sociable attitudes toward his fellow employees who
were of the black race.6 0 Defendants urged that section 1981 was
inapplicable since plaintiff's complaint did not include an allega-
tion of racial discrimination and that section1981 was not available
to "white citizens."'" The court pointed to cases limiting section
1981's scope to racial discrimination only," and concluded that
plaintiff's complaint was grounded not in racial bias, but rather in
a claim that he had been denied freedom of association.63 Further-
more, the court agreed that section 1981 was not subject to use by
whites, citing Perkins as controlling. 4 However, the court in a foot-
note took notice of the fact that white plaintiffs had in the past been
successful in asserting claims under the statute, but insisted that
the cases "represent aberration from the prevailing authority."6
Presumably, the court in Ripp agreed that section 1981 was enacted
for the benefit of non-whites only.
Prior to Hollander, a clear judicial trend was beginning to emerge;
courts more often than not held that section 1981 applied to "all
citizens" regardless of race and not merely to those groups which
had been the targets of prior discrimination.6 Hollander reinforced
59. 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D,. Ala. 1973).
60. Id. at 207.
61. Id. at 211.
62. See Abshire v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 352 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Marshall v.
Plumbers &,Steamfitters Local 60, 343 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1972); William v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (D.C. Cal. 1972); Fitzgerald v. United Methodist
Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972); Schetter v. Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
63. 366 F. Supp. at 208. The court said:
In paragraph 6 of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was discharged because he
refused to discriminate against black employees; further he alleges he was ordered "not
to associate" with black employees. While plaintiff makes these allegations concerning
his allegedly restricted associations, he also avers that defendant engaged in unlawful
employment practices which operate to discriminate against white employees. Fairly
stated, the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendants have abridged his
freedom to associate with persons of his own choosing.
Id. The court concluded that plaintiff had not stated a claim for relief based on an allegation
that "he had suffered any detriment on account of his race." Id. at 208-09.
64. Id. at 211.
65. Id. at 211 n.2.
66. See WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala. 1973);
Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (W.D. Tex. 1969); Central Presbyterian Church v. Black
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that trend and demonstrated conclusively the Congressional intent
that section 1981 be employed to protect all citizens, including
whites victimized by acts of racial discrimination.67 In so doing, it
undercut the assumptions in Perkins and Ripp concerning the pro-
per scope of the statute.
III. Effect of Title VII on the Propriety of § 1981 Actions
Although courts considering the bare question of whether whites
may sue to enforce their civil rights under section 1981 generally
answer in the affirmative,"8 this does not mean that victims of
proven racial discrimination-be they black or white-will auto-
matically be deemed entitled to relief under the statute. Some
courts take the position that the subject matter area of purely racial
private discrimination has been pre-empted by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.9
A. Operation of Title VII
The EEOC's purpose is to settle claims of private discrimination
which may arise under Title VII by means of conciliation, confer-
ences, and persuasion. 0 Under the procedure set out in the statute,
a grievant living in a state or subdivision which has a law prohibit-
ing the employment practices alleged must first present his claim
to local authorities for investigation and possible action.7 The
EEOC may not commence consideration of the complaint until
local authorities discontinue their investigation or fail to achieve a
Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F. 452
(C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905), rev'd, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
67. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 29-54 supra.
69. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91, 97-98 (D.D.C. 1973); Smith v.
North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 521 (N.D. Okla. 1970).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
71. Id. § 2000e-5(c). This section provides in pertinent part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or politi-
cal subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful em-
ployment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to
grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect
thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of
this section by the persons aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceed-
ings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have
been earlier terminated . . ..
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satisfactory solution to the problem within sixty days." If the EEOC
determines that an unlawful practice has occured, it must attempt
to conciliate the claim out-of-court. 3 Should conciliation efforts
prove unsuccessful within thirty days, the EEOC may act in either
of two ways: (1) it can send the petitioner a "90 day letter," inform-
ing him that conciliation has failed and that petitioner has ninety
days from the time of receipt of the letter to file a lawsuit in the
federal district court; 4 or (2) it may bring suit in its own name,
relieving petitioner of the necessity of having to finance the law-
suit.,,
The EEOC has no specific enforcement powers; however, it may
compel compliance with an order issued by a district court in any
action brought pursuant to the alternatives mentioned above.7" Dis-
missal of a complaint by the EEOC, or the failure of the EEOC to
sue in its own name, does not prevent petitioner from commencing
an action in his own behalf."
B. Title VII-Exclusive or Parallel Remedy?
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, then, provides administrative inves-
tigation, conciliation, and (to some extent) enforcement, as well as
litigation in the federal district courts. The elaborate structure of
procedures evidences a statutory purpose favoring administrative
action and consensual settlements-litigation is to be avoided
whenever possible. At the time of its enactment, Title VII was
widely heralded as the first effort by the federal government to
outlaw discrimination in private employment on the basis of race,
national origin, color, sex, or religion.7" Congressional debates re-
garding the statute reflect no hint that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
had already rendered private discrimination unlawful and action-
able in the federal courts. 9 Of course, these debates took place
72. Id. § 2000e-5(c).
73. ,d. § 2000e-5(b).
74. Id. § 2000e-5(f)1. See also Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.
1970).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)2 (Supp. III, 1973).
76. Id. § 2000e-5(i).
77. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
78. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND IX OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
at 11 [hereinafter cited as HISTORY].
79. Id. at 3075-98.
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four years before the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. ,1 so Congress had no judicial indication that section 1981
and the other provisions of the Reconstruction Acts prohibited pri-
vate discrimination."
The notion that Title VII should be the only remedy for private
discrimination enjoys widespread acceptance. In Smith v. North
American Rockwell Corp.,82 three employees (occupying different
positions) brought suit against defendant employer, seeking redress
for acts of alleged racial discrimination under section 1981. The
court refused to construe section 1981 as supporting subject matter
jurisdiction, contending that such a reading of the statute would
make Title VII "a redundancy and in large part an absurdity." 3
Pointing to the fact that it was being asked to simultaneously assess
the rights of individuals in three essentially different situations, the
court noted that a proper adjudication would require a series of
complex judgments to determine whether employees, each with dif-
ferent skills, abilities, qualifications, and seniority had been ac-
corded treatment by individual supervisors on a basis which did not
consider their race. 4 In declining to apply section 1981 to the situa-
tion, the court noted:85
Any construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a jurisdictional basis for judicial
decision in this complicated area of employment practices would be an un-
supportable avoidance of the evident purpose and meaning of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and particularly of the elaborate administrative and
litigative machinery provided thereunder.
Since the provisions of Title VII were, in the court's estimation,
more specific and comprehensive, the action was deemed fit only for
administrative disposition by the EEOC.8 Smith, together with
Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., Inc.,7 serves as a warning that section
1981 is not a carte blanche authorization to circumvent and under-
mine the preferred policy of exhausting administrative remedies
80. 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
81. HISTORY 3090.
82. 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla.,1970).
83. Id. at 518.
84. Id. at 520.
85. Id. at 520-21.
86. Id. at 525.
87. 60 F.R.D. 91, 98 (D.D.C. 1973).
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and utilizing the EEOC's conciliatory proceduresA
However, there is ample evidence to support the contention that
section 1981 provides a parallel, but substantially independent and
distinct remedy for private discrimination in employment from that
conferred by Title VII.A' While the aim of both statutes is the elimi-
nation of racial bias in the private sector, each statute treats differ-
ent aspects of the problem. First, Title VII proscribes many differ-
ent types of discrimination, including preference grounded in race,
national origin, color, sex, or religion,"9 whereas section 1981 is lim-
ited to racial discrimination only." Second, Title VII applies only
to discrimination practiced by specified groups of employers, labor
unions, and employment agencies. Only employers involved in in-
terstate commerce and having more than 15 employees are subject
to Title VII scrutiny; 2 moreover, private clubs" and educational
religious institutions are not within the purview of the statute. 4
Presumably, section 1981 provides the only cause of action an ag-
grieved party can assert against any of these employers. Third, Title
VII permits discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national
origin where it is "reasonably necessary" for business, although ra-
cial discrimination is not permitted for any reason. 5 Section 1981
does not recognize business necessity as a valid ground for denying
a party equal contract rights under any circumstances. Fourth, ac-
tions brought pursuant to Title VII must be commenced either (1)
within thirty days of notification that state investigation has
ceased" or (2) within ninety days of notification that EEOC concili-
ation efforts have failed. 7 No statute of limitations is included in
section 1981; the district courts use the statute of limitations for
comparable actions under state law as a yardstick for judging the
88. 50 F.R.D. 515, 521 (N.D. Okla. 1970).
89. See, e.g., Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Battle v. National City Bank,
364 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ohio 1973). See also Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement
Co;, 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1973).
91. Id. § 1981 (1970); see note 5 supra.
92. Id. § 2000e-2(b) (1970).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 2000e-1 (Supp. 111, 1973).
95. Id. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). See also Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. III, 1973).
97. Id. § 2000e-5(e) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
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timeliness of section 1981 actions." This usually results in a more
liberal time for filing complaints than is allowed under Title VII.?
The fact that Title VII and section 1981 are not precisely co-
extensive goes far to rebut the argument that the more recent act
repealed the older one. As indicated previously,'"' there could have
been no intentional repealer, since in 1964 the Congress had no
inkling that section 1981 prohibited private discrimination."0 ' Re-
peal by implication is disfavored,0 2 and can only exist where the
new statute is irreconcilable with the old, or where the latter act
covers the whole subject matter of the earlier one, and is clearly
intended as a substitute. 0 3 But in either case, the intention of the
legislature to repeal must be "clear and manifest"; 4 otherwise the
second act is construed as a continuation of the first.
Federal courts have recognized the similarities and differences
between the two statutes and have come to the conclusion that sec-
tion 1981 exists as an independent and separate remedy. In Brady
v. Bristol-Myers, Inc.,"05 plaintiff alleged racially-motivated dis-
crimination by defendant employer and sought redress under both
Title VII and section 1981. The district court dismissed the Title VII
claim as time-barred and refused to consider section 1981 a separate
ground for jurisdiction, 06 relying.heavily on the language of Chief
Judge Barrow in Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp.0 7 The
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff was entitled to be
heard on her section 1981 claim, notwithstanding that her title VII
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.' 8 Basing
its decision largely on the decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.,' 9 the court said:"0
98. Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757, 763 (3d Cir. 1971).
99. Id.
100. See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
101. HISTORY 3090. See also 110 CONG. REc. 8452, 8456 (1964).
102. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
103. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
104. Id.
105. 332 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972).
106. Id. at 998-1001.
107. 50 F.R.D. 515, 520-21 (N.D. Okla. 1970); see text accompanying note 83 supra.
108. 459 F.2d at 623.
109. 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
110. 459 F.2d at 623.
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An obvious parallel, and potential substantive overlap and conflict, existed
between § 1982 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Nevertheless,
the two statutes were allowed to stand independently, and both are today
available to civil rights litigants seeking to attack private discrimination in
transactions involving the sale or exchange of real or personal property. It
would seem more accordant with reason that § 1981 receive a similar
interpretation ....
The court concluded that section 1981 extended beyond state action
to reach private racially discriminatory employment practices."'
Similarly, Young v. ITT 12 indicated that nothing in the language
of Title VII evidenced an intention to deprive the courts of any pre-
existing jurisdiction, known or unknown." 3
C. Choosing an Appropriate Remedy
Given that both statutes exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the
subject matter, how does a victim of discrimination go about bring-
ing an action? Is exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title
VII a jurisdictional prerequisite for the maintainence of an action
under section 1981? Most circuit courts which have considered the
question hold that Title VII does not create a barrier to any action
brought pursuant to section 1981 and that there is no "choice of
remedies doctrine" which comes into play."4 However, the Seventh
Circuit, in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Har-
vester Co., stated that an aggrieved party may proceed directly
under section 1981 only if he has first exhausted his EEOC adminis-
trative remedies, or has pleaded a "reasonable excuse" for his fail-
ure to exhaust such remedies."' Waters' "reasonable excuse" test
was adopted in Tolbert v. Daniel Construction Co."' where plaintiff
sued defendant under Title VII for alleged acts of racial discrimina-
tion. Defendant moved to dismiss, claiming that plaintiff had not
acted within the time allowed by statute to file his claim. Plaintiff
amended his complaint to include a cause of action under section
111. Id.
112. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
113. Id. at 763.
114. Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974); Caldwell v. National Brewer Co.,
443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757
(3d Cir. 1971); Hardy v. Bucyrus-Erie Corp., 398 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
115. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
116. Id. at 487.
117. 332 F. Supp. 772 (D.S.C. 1971).
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1981. Although plaintiff's Title VII claim was barred by the statute
of limitations, the court held that plaintiff's delay in filing suit was
a "reasonable excuse" and that the court could take cognizance of
the section 1981 complaint."8
Despite the fact that section 1981 relief remains available to vic-
tims of racial discrimination in the private sector, the conciliation
features of Title VII should not be disregarded. As Smith v. North
American Rockwell Corp."' makes clear, the complex nature of
many modern controversies in the field of employment practices
calls for extended fact-finding procedures plus decision making at
many levels. The district courts are not so well-equipped to perform
these functions as is the EEOC.20 Even if conciliation fails, there
remains the chance that the EEOC may decide to assume peti-
tioner's burden in the district courts, achieving thereby the same
saving of time, effort, and money. 2' However, if justice can be ren-
dered only by granting an aggrieved party rapid injunctive relief,
section 1981 would seem more tailored to the task of preserving the
ultimate remedy. Similarly, if the racial discrimination complained
of does not occur in the context of employment, or is practiced by
employers not within the scope of Title VII, recourse to section 1981
is proper. 2 If, for example, the employer involved is a small busi-
nessman, a district court may be able to grasp the situation quickly
and issue appropriate orders to enjoin the unlawful acts; but if a
large corporate employer is involved, lengthy conciliation proceed-
ings may be necessary merely to reach an understanding of the
issues involved. 23
Section 1981 is far from a dead statute, but it is unlikely that
courts will permit it to be abused. Congress' clear intent is to avoid
litigation in the field of racial discrimination by private employers
whenever possible, and this intent will be carried into force by the
118. Id. at 774-75.
119. 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970); see text accompanying notes 82-88 supra.
120. 50 F.R.D. at 520. A second advantage of the conciliation route is that if the peti-
tioner's claim is resolved by either state authorities or the EEOC, he will avoid the costs
inherent in maintaining a lawsuit. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 89-99 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 89-99 supra.
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courts. Intelligent decisions must be made before a proper remedy
is selected; but as Young v. ITT points out:"'
By fashioning equitable relief with due regard to the availability of concilia-
tion and by encouraging in appropriate cases a resort to the EEOC during
the pendency of § 1981 cases the courts will carry out the policies of both
statutes.
IV. Section 1981 and Affirmative Action
The courts have long acknowledged the legitimacy of erasing the
effects of past racially-discriminatory practices.'25 Accordingly,
when it is determined that such practices have in fact occurred, the
courts may not only enjoin continuance of the practices, but may
additionally require the guilty party to "act affirmatively" to undo
the effects of past discrimination.'20 Such action may include the
hiring or reinstatement of employees, except that the court may not
direct hiring of an individual who was validly discharged, refused
employment, suspended, or expelled for any reason other than dis-
crimination. 27 Affording such relief is not merely discretionary with
the court; the courts themselves are said to be under an affirmative
duty to undo the effects of past discrimination and to prevent fur-
ther discrimination.2' In formulating appropriate remedies, courts
124. 438 F.2d 757, 764 (3d Cir. 1971).
125. E.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Mississippi 339 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.
1964).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible
for the unlawful employment practice) . . . .Interim earnings or amounts earnable
with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate
to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the
admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him
of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or
was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin or in violation of -section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679, 684 (5th Cir. 1964).
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may suspend, ignore, or otherwise invalidate valid state laws.'," To
promote fair employment practices, courts have created numerous
plans and formulae aimed at equalizing opportunities for all per-
sons. Courts have on occasion directed immediate hiring of certain
specified individuals,'3 ° or of a certain number of unspecified mem-
bers of a particular minority group,' 3 ' and have, on occasion, ordered
that minority group members be hired in ratio to non-minority em-
ployees.'32 On one occasion, a court ordered an employer to hire 30
percent minority.personnel for its next group of trainees, although
the percentage of minority workers in the area was but seven percent
of the work force.' 33
A. Affirmative Action: Preferences and Ratios
"Affirmative action" programs have been criticized on the ground
that they create a state of "reverse discrimination" as court direc-
tives demanding preference for members of one group may disqual-
ify from consideration non-group members with equal or superior
credentials.'34 In Carter v. Gallagher,'35 officers of the Minneapolis
Fire Department appealed from a district court ruling which or-
dered preferential treatment for blacks seeking appointment to the
Department. The district court had invalidated the procedure by
which applicants were selected for the Department, finding it to be
de facto discriminatory. To correct racial imbalance within the De-
partment which had resulted from prior discrimination, the district
court commanded that black applicants for appointment were to be
given an absolute preference in hiring until the percentage of black
129. See id.
130. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971). The court argued that federal district courts enjoy a wide range of powers to ease
the effects of discrimination by imposing affirmative action programs, and that this power is
not curtailed by the anti-preference provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id.
at 553.
131. United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.N.C. 1970). The
court ordered defendant to hire six black drivers immediately and to maintain a one to one
ratio of blacks to whites hired in the future. Id. at 479.
132. Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (1974); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
133. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 550-511 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971).
134. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
135. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
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firefighters fairly represented the percentage of black residents in
the city.' The effect of this "absolute preference" was to disqualify
white applicants with equal or better credentials simply because
they were white.'37 Officers of the Department sought to enjoin im-
plementation of the order, charging that it violated section 1981's
bar on discrimination in the making of contracts. Acknowledging
that section 1981 was available to white plaintiffs, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overturned this absolute preference
provision, stating:'38
We believe that § 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment proscribe any dis-
crimination in employment based on race, whether the discrimination be
against Whites or Blacks.
The court thus expressed its hesitancy to protect one group's consti-
tutional guarantees at the expense of another group's rights. Still,
Carter did not wholly eliminate the element of preference from the
Fire Department's hiring procedures; instead, it directed that a
ratio be implemented, whereby the Department would hire one
black worker for every three white workers hired, until the racial
composition of the Department more realistically reflected the ra-
cial character of the city.' 9
Ratios, such as employed in Carter, are not per se unconstitu-
tional. In fact the Supreme Court has noted them as being helpful
as a "starting point in the process of shaping a remedy.""' Yet some
jurists feel that the distinction beween a ratio and an absolute pref-
erence is perhaps too slight to be tenable. Judge Oosterhout, dis-
senting in Carter, argued that the ratio provision set up by the
majority was vulnerable to the same constitutional infirmity that
had felled the district court's absolute preference plan."' Whereas
a ratio might not discriminate against as many white applicants as
would the absolute preference, it would still, he urged, operate to
give some minority persons an undeserved edge over white appli-
cants with equal or superior credentials."' Oosterhout further noted
136. See id. at 318.
137. Id. at 325; see 34.Pirr. L. REv. 130 (1972).
138. 452 F.2d at 325.
139. Id. at 331.
140. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1" 25 (1971).
141. 452 F.2d at 332.
142. Id.
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that the blacks currently applying for appointment to the Fire De-
partment had not been victimized by their white fellow applicants;
therefore, he felt that they should not receive preferential treatment
of right, and their white counterparts should not be unduly penal-
ized. 143
The philosophy expressed by the dissent in Carter has gained
acceptance in other forums. In Castro v. Beecher,' Black plaintiffs
alleged discrimination in the method by which members of the Bos-
ton Police Department were selected, and they suggested a plan for
insuring that blacks would be appointed to the force in proportion
to their representation in the general population. This plea was
rejected by the court, which stated that there was no reason to put
blacks, for example, ahead of Indians, Chinese, whites, or any other
minority which might be in a comparable plight. The court pointed
out: "I
[Ilt is a fallacy to suppose that the Constitution entitles blacks to police
selected like jurors as representatives of a cross-section of a community.
Blacks have no more a constitutional right to a quota of black policemen than
a quota of black judges or legislators or state-employed teachers. What blacks
and other minorities have a right to is that public employees like policemen
shall be selected by criteria that are significantly related to a job.
Supporters of the view taken in Beecher insist that preferential
hiring violates certain Title VII anti-preference provisions.'46 How-
ever, their arguments often fall on deaf ears, since district courts are
vested with a great measure of discretion in shaping their decrees;'47
appellate courts generally do not interfere with that discretion un-
less gross abuse can be shown.'48
B. Using Title VII to Circumvent "Affirmative Action"
Affirmative action programs are a tightrope on which the courts
143. Id.
144. 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 459 F.2d 328 (lst Cir. 1971).
145. Id. at 949.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1970) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject
to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist ....
147. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry Co., 361 U.S. 288 (1965).
148. See United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
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must perform a balancing act. On one hand, they must try to imple-
ment the clear Congressional policy of eliminating discrimination
and its effects; on the other, they must avoid imposing "new badges
of slavery" by their actions. Some courts, as in Beecher, have satis-
fied themselves to stop present discrimination, believing that the
passage of time will cure racial imbalance occasioned by past bias.
More ambitious courts, as in Erie Human Relations Commission v.
Tullio,49 have sought to achieve a balance of interests by minimiz-
ing the adverse effects of preferential treatment on all parties in-
volved. Tullio involved a controversy concerning the procedure for
appointing cadets to the Police Department of Erie, Pennsylvania.
The district court found the established practice to be racially dis-
criminatoryl50 and ordered that fifty percent of all new appointees
were to be black, such ratio to endure until ten blacks had been
appointed to the force.' In this manner, the court sought to undo
the effects of prior racial bias. On appeal, the third Circuit Court
of Appeals refused to overturn the system, claiming that the public
interest mandated the ratio: 5 '
Indeed, given the sensitive and highly visible role played by the police in
maintaining racial peace and harmony, we feel that we should commend the
district court since its order acts decisively and yet at the same time is
carefully limited so that its adverse impact on others is minimized. Imposi-
tion of a 50% quota limited to the next 20 positions is not reversible error in
these circumstances.
The growing judicial recognition that whites may maintain ac-
tions under section 1981 promises to add more fuel to the affirmative
action controversy. If, as Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'53 pro-
claims, whites have full and equal rights to use section 1981 to bar
discrimination as to themselves, it is entirely conceivable that the
statute will be used to challenge judicially-imposed "affirmative
action" programs. In Carter v. Gallagher,' the court used its discre-
tion merely to modify the type of relief sought. Yet as the dissent
149. 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 34 (1974).
150 357 F. Supp. 422, 426 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd. 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.i cert denied,
419 U.S. 834 (1974).
151. 493 F.2d at 375.
152. Id
153. 392 F Aupp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975).
154. 452 F.2d '15 (8th Cir, 1971), cert dented, 406 ; S 950 119721
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there pointed out, there is no real reason why white citizens should
not be able to use section 1981 to overturn any affirmative action
program which grants a preference to non-whites.'55 Two unfavora-
ble results flow from such a reading of the statute. First, the wide
discretion permitted the district courts in fashioning relief in cases
involving discrimination would be severely limited. 5 Second,
whites would be allowed to employ section 1981 to sidestep the
preferred administrative remedies provided by Title VII and the
EEOC. Hence, a situation might develop where whites could em-
ploy the statute to circumvent the consequences of decrees entered
pursuant to Title VII authority and thereby undermine Title VII's
preferred remedies.'57
V. Conclusion
To date, there is no doctrine of "election of remedies" in Title VII
cases; a plaintiff may seek to vindicate his rights before as many
bodies as have jurisdiction to help him.' The sole condition to this
is that a plaintiff may not sue under Title VII in the district courts
until the claims which form the grievance have been considered by
the EEOC and that body has issued a "right to sue" letter.'59
Clearly, a statute should be enacted providing such a doctrine and
containing guidelines for deciding which statute a discrimination
155. See text accompanying notes 141-43 supra.
156. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry Co., 361 U.S. 288 (1965); United States
v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
157. But see Haber v. Klassen, 10 F.E.P. Cas. 1446 (N.D. Ohio 1975), where the court
held that whites may not seek relief under Title VII for racial discrimination. The opinion
relies heavily upon a statement in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
that
the complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing
(1) that he belongs to a racial minority . .
Id. at 802 (emphasis added). However, the McDonnell-Douglas case does not stipulate how
the term "minority" is to be defined, i.e., nationally, regionally, etc., or whether a prima facie
case of racial discrimination may be proven in more than one manner.
The court in Haber further states that the intention of Congress in enacting Title VII was
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and "'remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.'" 10
F.E.P. Cas. at 1447, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). Yet the
EEOC has traditionally afforded relief to whites seeking redress for racial bias. See, e.g.,
Hollander % Sears. Roebuck & Co.. 302 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975)
158. See Bulls v Holmes, 403 F Supp. 475 (E.D. Va. 1975)
159 42 1 S.C § 20(e-5f). a., amended, (Supp. Il. 1973).
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suit should be brought under-section 1981 or Title VII. Three
methods for providing a choice of remedies come immediately to
mind.
First, all restrictions on the scope of Title VII could be removed,
making the statute. proper recourse for all claims of private racial
discrimination. This would of course reduce section 1981 to a simple
declaration of rights once again. On the negative side, it might be
improper to subject all discrimination claims to administrative pro-
cessing, particularly where quick injunctive relief is necessary.
A second alternative would be to amend section 1981 to exclude
all cases which fall within the purview of Title VII. While this might
eliminate much confusion and duplication of effort, it would still
interfere with a plaintiff's ability to obtain injunctive relief, espe-
cially when such plaintiff is within the scope of Title VII.
Enactment of an entirely new statute, providing flexible guide-
lines for action, is the third and perhaps the most sensible option.
Such a statute should provide: (1) that a party may not use section
1981 unless he can show that "irreparable harm" would occur if he
were forced to wait for Title VII relief; (2) that all section 1981
claims should first be presented to state authorities in order to mini-
mize litigation in the federal courts; and (3) a statute of limitations
for section 1981 actions. The aim of the statute should be to avoid
litigation in discrimination cases, to provide the best possible fact-
finding procedures in complex employment relation cases, and to
carry into effect, as far as possible, the policies of both section 1981
and Title VII. This would, in turn, provide a statutory framework
where grievants would be able to determine how precisely to proceed
in order to procure relief. In addition, it would preserve the discre-
tion of the district courts in fashioning remedies to erase discrimina-
tory practices and their effects.
John M. Peterson
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